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11 Introduction
Social capital is probably the scientiﬁc concept that has gathered most attention
and most followers ever within a short period of time. It provides a common
language for all social sciences and has become a new buzzword (Paldam, 2000).
If social capital really is a new production factor which must be added to the
conventional concepts of human and physical capital, the concept will be of
extreme interest to all social scientists. Social capital was ﬁrst deﬁned by the
American sociologist James S. Coleman (1988) as “the ability to cooperate in
groups” and thereby achieve a common goal. Such ability to cooperate assures
an individual that he or she will not be taken advantage of by another individual,
even if the latter might get an economic net beneﬁtf r o md o i n gi t . E v e ni fi t
pays economically to commit a crime, free-ride or ignore the rules in a contract,
fewer will do it in the presence of trust because social norms tell them not to
do so. Thus, the community members’ preferences can be aﬀected and shaped,
due to social norms and social pressures (see Becker, 1996; Green and Shapiro,
1994; North 1990, for further discussions on unstable preferences). The concept,
however, is a broad concept in strong need of both deductive modeling and
inductive empirical surveys (Paldam, 2000). Social capital can be deﬁned in
many ways. Robert M. Solow, for example, writes
“Just what is social capital a stock of? Any stock of capital is a cumulation
of past ﬂows of investment, with past ﬂows of depreciation netted out. What
are those past investments in social capital? How could an accountant measure
them and cumulate them in principle?” (Solow 2000:7)
Poulsen and Svendsen (2004), for example, assume that social capital is
deﬁned as the social norm a person adheres to. This is expressed through the
person’s willingness to cooperate or defect in games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game. Despite the variety of deﬁnitions that prevail in the literature there is
a widely accepted consensus that, as any other form of capital, social capital
yields a proﬁt. Individuals invest in social interactions in order to earn a payoﬀ
that would otherwise not be earned.
As economists we are interested in investigating how individuals’ social in-
teractions and networking produce social capital. In what follows we explore
which social structure generates social capital. Sociologists still debate today
whether closed or opened network are required to generate and maintain social
capital1. Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988, 1990), and Putman (1993, 2000)
argue that closed networks in which all members are connected are the source
of social capital because it is closure that maintains trust, norms, authority and
sanctions.
Lin (1999), Burt (1992) and Rosenthal (1996) believe that extending con-
nection between networks is a better strategy2 than closure in order to produce
social capital. Borrowing to this literature we intend to show in an economic
1We do not intend to give here a full survey of the literature on social capital. For a more
detailed exposition the interested reader is referred to Lin (2001).
2In this theory the absence of links between networks is refered to as “structural holes”.
A person who connects two networks is called a broker.
2context that extending connections across networks without network closure
cannot result in the maintenance of the stock of social capital inside a society.
In fact we show via the use of two diﬀerent economic models that in a society in
which networks are extensive but not closed social capital cannot accumulate.
This view echoed the view of Burt (2001:52):
“While brokerage across structural holes is the source of value-added, closure
can be critical in realizing the value buried in the structural holes.”
To show this, we develop two diﬀerent models with two production sectors.
In each model, sector 1 is specialized in producing a pure consumption good.
Sector 2 is the informal sector, the one in which production of social capital
takes place. In both models, we assume that social capital is a collective asset
resulting from individuals’ social interaction. Social capital therefore “represents
some aggregation of valued resources...of members acting as a network or as
networks”. (Lin 2001:9).
In economic terms this translates into assuming the externalities enter the
production of both goods. Furthermore we can restrict these externalities to
be positive. This because social capital contributes positively to the production
of goods in society by facilitating the ﬂow of information between individuals.
By giving social credentials to individuals inside the networks it also speeds up
economic transactions. To understand this last point, assume, for the sake of
simplicity, that these community members socially can punish each other at
negligible costs, and that an agent receives the same return in terms of money
and saved time per unit of opportunism. Assume further, that the costs to the
opportunistic individual increases because the voluntary provision of collective
good is hampered more and more thus reducing the individual share of the
gains following collective good provision. Then an economically rational indi-
vidual will, without the presence of social capital, undertake opportunistic and
non-cooperative behavior at a higher level compared to the situation with the
presence of social capital. This idea is derived from the work of Ostrom (1990,
35) who writes that ‘Norms of behavior reﬂect valuations that individuals place
on actions or strategies in and of themselves, not as they are connected to imme-
diate consequences. When an individual has strongly internalized a norm related
to keeping promises, for example, the individual suﬀers shame and guilt when
a personal promise is broken. If the norm is shared with others, the individual
is also subject to considerable social censure for taking an action considered to
be wrong by others’ (our italics).
We now give two other economic example of the role of social capital in
economic transactions:
A ﬁrm for example, may lower transaction costs by having numerous informal
transactions taking place that are not formally sanctioned. These observations
relate to the transaction cost ideas of Coase (1937) and Williamson (1975) and
may also reﬂect the general business climate in a country. E.g., a business
manager in a high social capital country like Iceland would be less likely to
cheat you than a business manager in a low social capital country like Russia
(see Paldam and Svendsen, 2004; 2002; 2000).
Another example could be the relationship between tax payers and the gov-
3ernment. If people hold a high level of social capital, they will trust each other
and elected decision-makers as well. By that, the build-up and maintenance
of social capital will ease policy-making and make it more eﬀective since less
monitoring is necessary when a high level of social capital is present. Basi-
cally, people trust that the government will spend tax revenues for collective
good provisions (beneﬁcial to all taxpayers) rather than stealing their money.
This reciprocity idea is illustrated by a survey on shadow economy activities
by Schneider and Enste (2002). Here, one could argue that less monitoring of
shadow economy activity and tax evasion was needed in countries with high
levels of social capital because people generally cheat less.
Overall the social capital approach can be regarded as an attempt to combine
sociology (social norm) and economics (production factor). Concerning a thor-
ough review of the interdisciplinary development and theoretical foundations of
social capital within economics, political science, sociology, development theory
and philosophy, see Ostrom and Ahn (2003).
Our contribution is to make a ﬁrst attempt to model the informal insti-
tution of social capital for voluntary collective good provision by developing
a two-sector model for economic growth. The starting point is the empirical
observation from Svendsen and Svendsen (2004) claiming that social capital is
actually created in small-group settings with regular face-to-face interaction,
for example around small and decentralized production units such as coopera-
tive voluntary dairy movements. Hence, we hypothesize that the missing link
of social capital must be added as an important production factor when con-
sidering economic growth and the net outcome of any economic solution such
as economies of scale and centralization of production. Consequently, market
centralization processes in a capitalist society eventually may fragmentize and
thus destroy social capital if the collective good of local production and social
capital is not taken into account. To our knowledge, no such attempt to model
social capital has yet been undertaken and this gap or ‘missing link’ in economic
debates has to be developed to grasp a more holistic understanding of the big
diﬀerences in the wealth of nations or regions (Svendsen and Svendsen, 2003).
The model answers the big question whether social capital is a new produc-
tion factor along the traditional ones of human and physical capital. Presum-
ably, a group or society with members that trust each other may be capable of
accomplishing more economic growth than a similar society without trust. To
model this we proceed as follows.
In the ﬁrst model, we assume that society is composed of a continuum of
individuals that operate through extensive, open and well connected networks.
In the extreme, we can think as a network as a single household. Some house-
holds are connected to other via public communications means or institutions
controlled by the central planner. We refer to the ﬁrst economy as the central-
ized economy. We see that in such an economy interactions between household
in the informal sector can be totally anonymous ( or at least does not involve
personal ties). Thus, we assume that social capital is only used as an input in
the consumption good sector.
4In the second model we assume that society is composed of a continuum
of individuals that interact within closed and interconnected group. Society is
organized in small networks. each network is connected to an other through
personal ties between at least two members of each network. We see that in this
setting interaction between network is no longer anonymous. Due to potential
social sanctioning in a small group with regular face-to-face interaction, indi-
viduals are more likely to trust that other individuals will act cooperatively. In
terms of modelling assumption this translates into assuming that social capital
is now used as an input in its own production. We refer to this economy as the
decentralized economy.
In both the centralized and decentralized economy we assume that social
capital is the product of interaction between individuals. To simplify matters
we assume that the number of interactions between individuals is equal to the
total number of individuals in this economy. Since population is not growing
by assumption, we can normalize the total number of contacts to unity. In the
centralized economy we assume that social capital is solely the product of the
number of interactions between individuals. In the decentralized economy social
capital is produced using a fraction of the current stock of social capital and the
number of interactions between individuals.
2 The common framework of both models
The economy is populated by a continuum of identical consumers indexed by h,
where h ∈ [0,1]. All consumers are inﬁnitely lived and rational. Each consumer
h is initially endowed with an equal fraction of the aggregate capital stock
kh
0 = k, and a single unit of labor. These productive resources are allocated
optimally between the two productive sectors of the economy. The representa-
tive consumer maximizes his (discounted) intertemporal welfare. At any point
of time (which is discrete), welfare is measured by a utility function of current
















where β is the discount rate, 0 <β<1. Any consumer h ∈ [0,1] is
initially endowed with an equal fraction of the aggregate capital stock kh
0 = k.
. The production side is composed of two continua of ﬁrms indexed by i, where
i =1 ,2. Within each sector ﬁrms are identical. We assume that, the production
5technology of both representative ﬁrms also depends on the aggregate stock
of social capital in any given period. We denote this variable by X, where
X =
R 1
0 k(h)dh. Social Capital is assumed to depreciate in each time period.
Denoting by δ the depreciation rate, this amounts to
Assumption 2 :0<δ<1 for all t ≥ 0.
The number of total interactions lt i saf a c t o ri nﬁxed supply. It is equal
to the number of agents in this economy. It will for simplicity be normalized
to unity. We assume that some of the interactions between the agents of the
model only happens at the production level ( some agents come together to
produce a good). Some interactions between agents happens outside the pro-
duction process ( agents meet informally and creates ties). The total number of
interactions happens in the two sectors of the economy. We assume that sector
1 is the output sector. Sector 2 is the informal sector in which social capital is
produced. The number of interactions happening at the production level will
be labelled by l1
t. The number of interactions happening at the informal level
will be labelled by l2
t. If yt denotes the current production of the social capital
good sector, then the the stock of social capital for next period, kt+1 is equal to
kt+1 = yt +( 1− δ)kt. (2)
3 The centralized Economy
3.1 The Model
We omit the time subscripts whenever they are not necessary. We assume
that production of output in sector 1 uses all the social capital available in the
economy. The production technology used in sector 2 is linear3. Social capital
also generate positive externalities that aﬀect the production of both sectors.
c = F1(k,l1,X),
y = Al2X.
In sector 1, we suppose that along a path with external eﬀects, the marginal
productivities of both inputs are positive. The production of output is assumed
to exhibit diminishing marginal productivities in private inputs for a given level
of the aggregate capital stock X. We restrict the spillovers to be labor aug-
menting4 In other words, we assume the following:
3This assumption guarantees that private returns are constant in the investment good
sector. The same result would be obtained had we assumed that the investment good sector
were to use a factor in ﬁxed supply and labor as inputs.
4This form of labor augmenting technological progress has been extensively used by the
learning by doing literature see Arrow (1962), Uzawa (1961), Sheshinski (1967), Harrod (1973),
Romer (1986) and Lucas (1988).
6Assumption 3:F o ri =1 ,2, F1 : <3
+ → <+, are continuous functions. For
ag i v e nX ∈ <+:
(i) F1(.,.,.)i sC3 on <++ ×< ++ ×< +;
(ii) F1(.,.,X) is homogenous of degree one and increasing over <++×< ++;
(iii) F1









(v)E x t e r n a le ﬀects in sector 1 are Harrod-Neutral. F1(k,l1,X)=F1(k,l1X),
where F1(.,.) is homogenous of degree 1 in k and l1X.
(vi) F1(0,l1,X)=F1(k1,0,X)=0
Assumption 4:A >δ .
For this class of economies, the Production Possibility Frontier (P.P.F.) is
given by the following maximization problem:











kt ≥ 0,l i
t ≥ 0, {Xt}∞
t=0 given.
Under Assumption 3, and given that kt ∈ <∗
+,l i
t ∈ [0,1], Problem (3) is
a standard concave maximization problem, for {Xt}∞
t=0 given. Assumption 3
ensures interiority of solutions to (3). Under Assumption T3b, we can apply the
implicit function theorem to solve for the demand of labor in the investment













For interior solutions to (3) for all given Xt ≥ 0 the feasible set D(Xt)c a n
then be restricted to
{(kt,kt+1) ∈ <+ ×<:( 1− δ)kt ≤ kt+1 ≤ AXt +( 1− δ)kt}.
Using the standard deﬁnition of the indirect utility function given by V (kt,k t+1,X t),













ko = ¯ k, (6)
(kt,k t+1) ∈ D(Xt).
{Xt}∞
t=0 given.
An equilibrium path {kt}, is an interior solution to Problem (6) if it solves a
ﬁxed point problem5 {kt{Xt}} = {Xt} together with the necessary and suﬃcient
conditions given in the next Lemma:
Lemma 1 Let {kt}∞
t=0 be feasible path from k0. Then it solves the maximization















tV (1,γt,1) < ∞. (9)
Proof. See Boldrin, Nishimura, Shigoka and Yano (2003), Drugeon, Poulsen
and Venditti (2003).
3.2 Existence, uniqueness and stability of the growth ray




In this framework since γ = A +1 − δ and γ =1− δ. The Transversality
Condition (8) will be satisﬁed if the following assumption holds:
Assumption 5: βγα < 1.
5We do not consider the question of existence to the ﬁxed point problem for which the
sequence of externalities {Xt} satisﬁes {kt{Xt}} = {Xt} for all t ≥ 0. A detailed treatment
of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper. We refer the reader to Romer (1983) and Mitra
(1998). They both address the existence issue of the ﬁxed point problem {kt{Xt}} = {Xt}
for all t ≥ 0 in a slightly diﬀerent framework.
8Lemma 2 Assume that Assumptions 1-5 are satisﬁed. Then there exists an
interior equilibrium balanced growth factor γ.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 are satisﬁed. Then there exists a
unique interior growth ray that satisﬁes the conditions of Lemma 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Following Boldrin and Rusticchini (1998) we give next a more precise deﬁ-
nition of what is meant by indeterminacy.
Deﬁnition 4 Ag r o w t hr a ykt = γtk0 is locally indeterminate if for every  >
0, there exists another equilibrium sequence {k0
t} with γ ´




1| < with k0 = k0
0.
For a system of dimension two, indeterminacy occurs when the two roots
of the characteristic polynomial are inside the unit circle. We see, from (15),
that in our model the dynamic system is of dimension 1. Therefore, if the
root associated with (15) is within (−1,1), then the growth ray will be locally
indeterminate. In this model stability means indeterminacy.
Proposition 5 Suppose that Assumptions 1-5 are satisﬁed. Suppose also that
V21 is strictly monotonic increasing for all γt ∈ (0,γ), then the balanced growth
path is locally unstable (i.e. locally determinate).
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 6 If {ct}∞
t=0 > 0 for all t > 0, then the stock of social capital in the
decentralized economy will fall forever.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 5 and Corollary 6 imply that unless an economy starts initially in
the interior equilibrium, it will never converge to it. Suppose that the economy
is initially in the equilibrium and that γ>1. In this case the stock of social
capital grows at a constant rate G =γ −1 > 0. Suppose now that an exogenous
shock hits the economy, then the economy will converge either to the equilibrium
where G = γ − 1=−δ or towards G = A − δ. In the ﬁrst equilibrium, as time
goes by the stock of social capital will disappear. In the second equilibrium,
the stock of social capital would grow at a positive rate but all productive
resources would be allocated to the production of social capital at the expense
of consumption.
We now need to consider what happens in this framework if V21 is not strictly
monotonic increasing. this is the purpose of the next subsection.
93.3 Chaos
In this paper we will use the notion of chaos in the sense of Geometric Sensitivity
and Ergodic Oscillations. The notion of geometric sensitivity can be deﬁned as
follows:
Deﬁnition 7 (Nishimura and Yano (2000)). The dynamical system (I,θ), ex-
hibits Geometric Sensitivity (GS) if there exists a constant h>1 such that for
any τ ≥ 0 there exists ε>0 such that for all x and x0 ∈ I with |xt − x0
t| <ε




¯ ¯ ≥ ht |x − x0|.
As I is bounded, the geometric magniﬁcation of the eﬀects of a small pertur-
bation cannot last indeﬁnitely. Furthermore, the dynamical system (I,θ)h a s
no locally stable cyclical path.
There is also the notion of ergodic chaos. Ergodic chaos is a stronger property
than topological chaos in the sense that it is “observable chaos”.
Let Υ be a σ-algebra on I. 6 Deﬁne a probability measure µ : Υ → <+
such that (i) µ(∅)=0a n d( ii) µ(∪∞
n=0Yn)=Σ∞
n=0µ(Yn), (iii) µ(I)=1 ,w h e r e
{Yt}∞
n=0 is a countable collection of disjoint sets in Υ.W ec a nn o wd e ﬁne the
concepts of ergodic chaos in the following way:
Deﬁnition 8 The dynamical system (I,θ) exhibits ergodic chaos if there ex-
ists a probability measure µ on I which is absolutely continuous, invariant and
ergodic.
Lasota and Yorke (1973) establish that if θ is a piecewise C2 and expansive
mapping then there exists an absolutely continuous invariant measure
Deﬁnition 9 A mapping θ deﬁned on [a,b] is piecewise C2 and expansive if:
1. There exists a ﬁnite set x0 = a<x 1 <x 2 < ... < xn = b,





¯ ¯ ≥ h>1 for all x ∈ (xj,xj+1).
Li and Yorke (1978) show that if θ is also a unimodal map then this measure
is ergodic.
Deﬁnition 10 Assume there exits a constant c ∈ [a,b],a<c<b .Then a
mapping θ, deﬁned on [a,b] is unimodal if
1. θ is continuous on [a,b],
6A σ−algebra is a collection of subsets Υ of I such that (i) I is inside Υ, (ii) the complement
of any set Y included in Υ is also in Υ, (iii) the union of any countable collection of subsets
in Υ is inside Υ.
102. θ is strictly increasing on (a,c) and strictly deceasing on (c,b).
Nishimura and Yano (2000) establish that a map that is expansive is also
chaotic in the sense of GS. We state the Lasota and Yorke (1973) and Li and
Yorke (1978) results as well as the result on GS in the next theorem.
Theorem 11 (Lasota and Yorke (1973), Li and Yorke (1978), Nishimura and
Yano (2000)):
Let (I,θ) be a dynamical system. If θ : I → I is expansive and unimodal then θ
is chaotic in the sense of ergodic oscillations and GS.
Let us investigate the occurrence of chaos.
Proposition 12 Suppose that Assumptions 1-3 are satisﬁed. If V21 is not
strictly monotonic increasing for all γt ∈ (0,γ), then if the growth ray exhibits
chaos in the sense of Geometric Sensitivity and ergodicity.
Proposition 12 implies that unless the economy initially starts in an equilib-
rium where the stock of social capital is originally growing at a constant rate,
then the growth factor of social capital will ﬂuctuate forever. Because it of
geometric sensitivity, unless the policy maker knows exactly the initial growth
factor of the social capital stock, it cannot predict the long run evolution of
the system. Hence any policy designed to increase the growth factor of social
capital would have unpredictable consequences in the long run.
4 The Decentralized Economy
4.1 The Model
As above we assume that sector 1 is the output sector. It uses some social cap-
ital and the number of interactions between agents. Social capital and output
are produced using both social capital and the number of interactions between
agents as inputs. In the centralized economy, we assumed that social capital
is solely the product of the number of interactions between individuals because
interactions between individuals are anonymous. Therefore, individuals do gen-
erally not experience repeated face-to-face interaction with the same individuals.
This situation changes in the decentralized economy as individuals tend to inter-
act in non-anonymous way in small group settings. Here, members get to know
each personally due to repeated social encounter and therefore social capital is
arguably produced using a fraction of the current stock of social capital and the
number of interactions between individuals. In other words, social capital does
not enter the production of social capital in the centralized economy because
the social sanction mechanism is weaker and it is easier to free-ride on collective
good provisions. As in the centralized economy, social capital also generate pos-
itive externalities that aﬀect the production of both sectors. We again restrict
the spillovers to be labor augmenting:
11Assumption 3b: Fi : <3
+ → <+,i=1 ,2 is continuous. For a given
X ∈ <+, it satisﬁes:
(i) Fi(.,.,.)i so fc l a s sC2 on <++ ×< ++ ×< +;
(ii) Fi(.,.,X) is homogenous of degree one and increasing over <++ ×< ++;
(iii) Fi









(v) Fi(ki,li,X)=Fi(ki,l iX),i=1 ,2, where Fi(.,.) is homogenous of
degree 1 in ki and liX.
We deﬁne the social production possibility frontier, T(k,y,X). It is the value
function of the maximization problem in which the representative ﬁrm chooses
its output level given the existing stock of social capital, full employment of
inputs, and the aggregate social capital stock X. In other words,





k = k1 + k2,
1=l1 + l2,
ki ≥ 0,l i ≥ 0,i =1 ,2.
For all given X ≥ 0
Assumption 6 : T(k,y,X)i so fc l a s sC2 on <++ ×< ++ ×< +.
Using a standard argument it can be shown that for any given X ≥ 0,
T(k,y,X) is concave. The set of feasible interior solutions to (11) is is non-
empty and convex and deﬁned as
D(Xt)={(kt,kt+1) ∈ <+ ×< + :( 1− δ)kt ≤ kt+1 ≤ F2(kt,X t)}.
Benhabib and Nishimura (1985) show that the sign of T21 is positive (neg-
ative) if the investment good sector is more (less) capital intensive than the
consumption good sector. The consumption good sector is said to be more so-
cial capital intensive if the net social capital stock, k1/l1, in the output sector is
higher than the net social capital stock in the investment good sectork2/l2. Dru-
geon and Venditti (1998) establish that ki(kt,y t,X t)a n dli(kt,y t,X t),i=1 ,2,
are homogenous of degree 1 and 0, respectively if external eﬀects in both sectors
are Harrod-Neutral. Hence T(kt,y t,X t) is homogenous of degree 1. Drugeon,
Poulsen and Venditti (2003) and Poulsen (2003)establish:
12Lemma 13 Let Assumptions 1-3b and 4-6 be satisﬁed. Then T(kt,y t,X t) is


















































Proof. See Drugeon and Venditti (1998) and Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti
(2003), Poulsen (2001).
Corollary 14 Suppose the consumption good sector is capital intensive. Then,
T23 > 0.
5 Existence, Uniqueness and Indeterminacy
The growth factor of social capital can be deﬁned as kt+1/kt = γt. The maximum
feasible growth factor is γ and γ is the minimum feasible growth factor. Under
Harrod-Neutrality, γ = F2(1,1) and γ =1 − δ. For the model to display
endogenous growth we need γ>1. To ensure existence of an interior growth
ray with endogenous growth we also need F2(1,1) >δ .In this case the model
does not have a steady state. A growth ray is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 15 An equilibrium path {kt} is a growth ray if there exists a growth
factor γ ∈ [0,γ] such that for all t ≥ 0,k t = γtk0, where k0 6=0 .




t V2(1,γt,1) + βV1(1,γt+1,1) = 0, (15)
lim
t→∞β




tV (1,γt,1) < ∞. (17)
The transversality condition (16) is satisﬁed along a growth ray if the following
assumption holds:
Assumption 4b: β[F2(1,1) + 1 − δ]α < 1.
13Proposition 16 Let Assumptions 1-4b and 5-7 be satisﬁed. Then there exists
an interior growth ray, e γ ∈ (1,γ) if F2(1,1) >δand
β[F2
1(k2(1,e γ,1),l2(1,e γ,1)) > 1.
Proof. See Goenka and Poulsen (2004).
In what follows we show that local indeterminacy arises no matter which
sector is more social capital intensive. Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti (2003)
show that the allocation of productive resources between the two sectors aﬀects
the uniqueness property of the growth ray. Furthermore, a necessary condition
for the occurrence of multiple growth ray is that the investment good sector is
capital intensive at the private level at the growth ray. The multiplicity results
are not aﬀected by the time structure of the model. We therefore refer the
reader to this paper for a more detailed exposition.
Proposition 17 Let Assumptions 1-5 be satisﬁed. Then,
(i) A necessary condition for the growth ray to be locally indeterminate is
V23
V12
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(1,e γ+1−δ,1)
< 0. (18)
(ii) A necessary and suﬃcient condition for the growth ray to be locally inde-







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
(1,e γ+1−δ,1)
< 1.
Proof. See Goenka and Poulsen (2004).
Proposition 17 and the uniqueness result of Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti
(2003) imply that when the consumption good sector is more social capital
intensive, then the stock of social capital will grow at a constant rate G. It may
stay there forever if V21(1,γ,1) < 0 i.e. if social capital does not depreciate too
slowly and if the marginal utility of consumption is relatively inelastic7.I nt h i s
case they would also exists an inﬁnity of social capital sequences all growing
asymptotically at the same rate.
If the investment good sector is more social capital intensive then the Dru-
geon, Poulsen and Venditti (2003) have established the following result
7Goenka and Poulsen (2004) shows that V21 < 0i fT [T12 − (1 − δ)T22]+( α −





T [T12 − (1 − δ)T22]
T2 [T1 − (1 − δ)T2]
> 1 − α.
14Proposition 18 Let assumptions1-4b and 5-7 be satisﬁed.
















(ii) A necessary condition for the occurrence of at least three growth rays is that
the investment good sector is more capital intensive.
Proof. See Drugeon, Poulsen and Venditti (2003).
This would imply that there exists at least one equilibrium with a low growth
rate, one equilibrium with a medium growth rate and one equilibrium with a
high growth rate for social capital. If the medium equilibrium is stable then it
follows that the low one and the high one are unstable. The economy ’s stock of
social capital would be growing at a positive growth rate. We can now establish
the following result.
Corollary 19 Suppose there exists three equilibria. Then a necessary condition







Proof. See the Appendix.
6C o n c l u s i o n
We developed a two-sector social capital model to answer the question whether
social capital is a new production factor along the traditional ones of human
and physical capital. The hypothesis was that social capital must be added as
an important production factor when considering economic growth and the net
outcome of any economic solution such as economies of scale and centralization
of production.
To model this, we suggested two models, namely a centralized and a decen-
tralized economy. Also, we assumed that social capital is the product of repeated
social interaction between individuals. Thus, in the centralized economy, we as-
sumed that social capital is for, a given level of the aggregate social capital
stock, solely the product of the number of interactions between individuals be-
cause interactions between individuals are anonymous. Therefore, individuals
do generally not experience repeated face-to-face interaction with the same in-
dividuals. This social pattern situation changes in the decentralized economy
as individuals tend to interact in non-anonymous way in small group settings.
Here, members get to know each personally due to repeated social encounter
and therefore social capital is arguably produced using a fraction of the current
stock of social capital and the number of interactions between individuals. In
15other words, social capital does not enter the production of social capital in the
centralized economy because the social sanction mechanism is weaker and it is
easier to free-ride on collective good provisions.
The comparison between the decentralized economy and the centralized
economy indicates that as one moves from a decentralized to a centralized
economy social capital is lost. This is because as the economy moves from
a decentralized to a centralized economy social capital is no longer used in the
production of social capital. This aﬀects the stability and uniqueness property
of the equilibrium. We showed that, the necessary conditions for the decen-
tralized economy to converge in the long run to a positive growth rate of the
social capital stock are satisﬁed both when either of the two productive sector is
social capital intensive provided that utility is not too concave. In the central-
ized economy, the stock of social capital either never grows or is aperiodic and
exhibits strong dependency on initial conditions. In other words policies aiming
at enhancing the rate of growth of social capital in a centralized economy are
not feasible.
In the decentralized economy, if the social capital good sector is more social
capital intensive then there may also exists several equilibria. An important
implication of this is that the policy maker should be very careful in designing
policies to enhance the growth rate of the social capital in a decentralized society.
When there exist several equilibria policy ﬁne tuning is essential in determining
which equilibrium the economy converges to.
The model showed that if the policy maker decides to centralize the economy,
then the economy moves from an potentially stable equilibrium to an unstable
one that may under certain condition even ﬂuctuates forever.
One important implication of these results is that market centralization pro-
cesses in a capitalist society eventually may fragmentize and thus destroy social
capital if the positive externality of local production and social capital is not
taken into account. Therefore, both private and public decision-makers and all
students of the social sciences should take this potential market failure of cen-
tralizing ‘too much’ at the expense of social capital. Rather decision-making
a n df u t u r er e s e a r c hs h o u l db eg u i d e dt o w a r d st h es e a r c ho fn e wo p t i m a lo u t -
comes when adjusting centralization processes for potential social capital losses
or gains.
7A p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a2
















































Under Assumption 3, F1(k,l1X) is homogenous of degree one. The Euler














From the Euler theorem on homogenous functions, we know that F1
1 and F1
2 are
























γ − γt. (23)













































This is equivalent to
lim
γ→γ
ξ(γ) < γ. (26)




Or using the deﬁnition of ζ(γ) given in (19) as
lim
γ→γ
ζ(γ) > γ. (27)




ξ(γ) > 0. A
suﬃcient condition for the existence of γ ∈ [1,γ]i st h e n
ζ(γ) − ξ(γ) < 0.













Proof of Lemma 3













So, the uniqueness of the balanced growth path depends on whether or not ξ(γ)



























Hence, we see that the suﬃcient condition for a unique balanced growth path
is satisﬁed. The uniqueness result follows.
Proof of Lemma 5


































































It follows that we have the sign of dγt+1/dγt. depends on the sign of V21(1,γ,1).
The necessary and suﬃcient condition for the growth ray to be locally stable is





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ < 1. (34)





















12 [AXt − kt+1]
A2 (AXt − yt)
. (36)























19(37) implies that, for γ ∈ [A,
−
γ), we have V21(1,γ,1) > 0. So, for all γt ∈ [A,γ),
(37) and (37) imply that





¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ > 1. (38)

















for all γt ∈ [0,A)a n dt h a tγ ∈ [0,A). Since by assumption V21(1,γ,1) > 0i t
follows that the growth ray is determinate (i.e. unstable).
Proof of Lemma 6




t V2(1,γt,1) and f(γt)=V1(1,γt+1,1).
If V21(1,γt,1) > 0 it follows that we can transform the Euler into the ﬁrst
order diﬀerence equation
γt+1 = θ(γt).















We have seen above that the sign of θ
0
(γt) depends on the sign of V12(1,γt,1).
If V12(1,γt,1) > 0 for all γt ∈ [0,A)t h e ni tf o l l o w st h a tθ
0
(γt) > 0 for all γt ∈



























+ βv(θ(γt)) = 0, (40)
20where v(γt)=V1(1,γt,1). As γt →
−

















































V21(1,γt,1) > 0. (42)







































The suﬃcient condition for existence given in Proposition 2 then implies that





















θ(1 − δ) > 1 − δ.
21The uniqueness and stability results of Proposition 3 and imply that
θ(1 − δ)=1− δ.
It follows that
−
γ and γ are the only two stable equilibria. Hence if {ct}∞
t=0 > 0
for all t > 0, then the stock of social capital in the decentralized economy will
never grow.
Proof of Proposition 12

















We know from Proposition ?? that
θ
0
(γt) > 0i fV12(1,γt,1) > 0 for all γt ∈ [1 − δ,A) (46)

















for some γt ∈ [0,A).
It follows that there exists at least one γt ∈ [0,A) such that V21(1,γt,1) = 0.





t V2(1,γt,1) and f(γt)=V1(1,γt+1,1) we see that the
ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation γt+1 = θ(γt) is no longer deﬁned8 for at least
γt ∈ [0,A). However g ´(γt)=( 1− α)γ
−α
t V2(1,γt,1) + γ
1−α
t V22(1,γt,1) < 0. It
follows that we can deﬁne the following ﬁrst order diﬀerence equation
γt = τ(γt+1).







Given that there exists a unique γ ∈ [0,A). such that V21(1,γ,1) = 0 and that
V21(1,γt,1) < 0 for all γt ∈ [0,γ),
V21(1,γt,1) > 0 for all γt ∈ (γ,γ),
8For a more detailled exposition see Goenka and Poulsen (2004 b).





for all γt ∈ (γ,γ)t h e nθ(γt)i se x p a n s i v e .
Proof of Corollary 19.

























then we see that 47 is equivalent to
κ ´(e γ) >η ´(e γ).







For endogenous growth we need e γ>1.
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